Theme : Dreams
Counterfactual Cognitive Operations in Dreams
Patrick McNamara,1,4 Jensine Andresen,2,4 Joshua Arrowood,3 and Glen
Messer3
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
We hypothesized that counterfactual (CF) thought occurs in dreams and
that cognitive operations in dreams function to identify a norm violation
or novel outcome (recorded in episodic memory) and then to integrate this
new content into memory by generating counterfactuals to the violation.
In study 1 we compared counterfactual content in 50 dream reports, 50
pain memory reports and 50 pleasant memory reports (equated for word length)
and found a significantly greater number of CFs in dream and in pain memory
reports relative to pleasant memory reports. In study 2 we used a more
liberal method for scoring CF content and analyzed 34 dream reports obtained
from elderly individuals engaged in an ongoing study of neuropsychologic,
health and religiosity variables. Study 2 also examined neuropsychologic
associations to CF content variables. In the elderly sample and with our
more liberal scoring procedures we found that norm violations along with
counterfactual-like attempts to correct the violations occurred in 97%
of reports. In 47% of these cases (roughly half of all reports), attempts
to undo the violation obeyed at least one constraint on mutability typically
observed in laboratory studies of CF processing. Cognitive operations
associated with attempts to undo the norm violation (e.g. transforming
focal actors or the most recent causal antecedent of the violation) were
significantly correlated with measures of right frontal function. We conclude
that dreaming may involve a process of learning from novel outcomes (particularly
negative outcomes) by simulating alternative ways of handling these outcomes
through counterfactual cognitive processes.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
KEY WORDS: dreams; counterfactuals; mental simulations; norm theory;
right frontal cortex.
INTRODUCTION
What is the function, if any, of dreaming and how is dreaming consciousness
related to waking consciousness? One source of information as to the nature
of the dream is the analysis of dream content. If such analyses were to
find that dream content was composed, for example, of thoughts and associations
centered around ‘current concerns’, then we would be justified
in exploring the possibility that the function of dreaming had something
to do with problem solving around current concerns in waking life. Or
if we found that no single type of cognitive activity predominated in
dreams and instead that the content of dreams was typically bizarre and
random, then dreaming would probably have no important or discernible
cognitive function.
Several hypotheses concerning the nature of dream cognition have been
proposed. Most of these hypotheses can be read as reflecting the fundamental
assumption of continuity between dream consciousness and waking consciousness.
The continuity assumption states that dream cognition and waking cognition
are alike in all fundamental respects except that dream consciousness
lacks the reflective or evaluative capacity of waking consciousness. Foulkes
(1985), for example, argued that dreams were ‘credible world analogs’
or imaginative simulations of waking life that obeyed fundamental rules
of waking cognition but they differed from waking cognition in that they
to a great extent lacked reflective thought. Rechtschaffen (1978) too,
emphasized the single-mindedness quality of the thought that occurs in
dreams. He observed that we do not usually entertain two thoughts at once
during a dream and we usually naively and unreflectively accept whatever
occurs in the dream action as real. Reviewing quantitative studies of
dream content across a wide variety of populations, Domhoff (1996) found
that dream reports were typically fairly representative of waking thoughts
and concerns of the dreamer, except perhaps in such emotion-laden categories
as aggression and victimization. These anomalies, however, could also
be due to a reduction in reflective thought insofar as it results in a
lack of censorship or inhibition. Hartmann (1996) has suggested that dream
cognition, like waking cognition, is the product of spreading excitation
between semantic nodes in a semantic network. In the case of dreams however
the patterns of activation are able to make connections more broadly and
more inclusively than does waking cognition-presumably because of the
lifting of some waking-associated inhibitory process or the lack of focal
attention or censorship. The activation patterns are thought not to be
random but to reflect the waking concerns of the dreamer. Finally, Hobson,
Pace-Schott, Stickgold, and Kahn (1998) have pointed out that PET studies
have repeatedly demonstrated lack of normal activation of dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex during REM sleep. The reduced activation of dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex may help explain the one consistent difference dream
cognition displays relative to waking cognition: lack of reflective or
evaluative capacity.
Despite the impressive evidence for overall continuity between dream
and waking consciousness (minus reflective capacity) there is equally
persuasive evidence for a version of a discontinuity hypothesis—i.e.
that dreams represent a fundamentally dissimilar form of cognitive processing
when compared to waking consciousness. Several authors, including Freud
and Jung, have commented on the occurrence of metaphor and the symbolic
nature of dreaming (see for example Lakoff, 1993). These investigators
believe that dreams prefer a kind of condensed pictorial language to evaluate
meanings, particularly emotional meanings. The content-the settings and
happenings- of most people’s dreams seems to differ in important
ways from their waking lives. Strauch and Meier (1996), for example, reported
that most dreams contain non-normal or unfamiliar background settings
and that half of the dream reports in their sample contained people who
were unknown to the dreamer (strangers). Dreaming or its associate REM
sleep, also appears to be associated, like other specialized cognitive
functions, with activation of a selective set of neural structures—namely
those in and around the basal forebrain. Solms’ (1997) exhaustive
review of the neuropsychologic literature on loss of dreaming after brain
damage convincingly demonstrates that the connections between mediobasal
frontal cortex and the dienchephalic and brainstem sites are ‘centrally
implicated’ in the activation and maintenance of dreaming. When any
key element in the orbitofrontal-diencephalic/brainstem circuit is lesioned,
people report loss of dreaming. In waking life the basal forebrain structures
support a range of appetitive behaviors such as curiosity, emotional interest,
and other goal-driven behaviors. They are also implicated in learning
and memory. Damage to cholinergic circuits of the basal forebrain are
implicated in various dementing syndromes including Alzheimer’s disease.
Thus REM sleep apparently relies on specialized neural machinery to accomplish
its goals. To the extent that REM sleep and dreaming is associated with
brain activation patterns distinct from those typically activated during
waking life, it seems unlikely that complete continuity in cognitive processes
between dreaming and waking cognition could be sustained.
We take a middle position in the continuity-discontinuity debate. We
suggest that dream consciousness is distinct from waking consciousness
in that it utilizes various processing procedures of waking life to compute
distinct and unique outputs relative to the products of cognitive systems
of waking life. In addition the inputs to these procedures are anomalous
when compared to experiences of waking life. The dream takes unusual input,
applies a specialized computational procedure to this input and then outputs
a distinct product. The ‘computational procedure’ is borrowed
from waking life but is altered slightly and thus it is guaranteed to
produce a distinct product. McNamara (2000) suggested that one such cognitive
procedure in dreaming involved the processing of counterfactual simulations
generated in response to an anomaly or negative event in a dream narrative.
This idea was summarized in the following hypothesis:
Cognitive operations in dreams function to identify a norm violation
recorded in episodic and autobiographical memory and then to re-instate
normality in memory by generating counterfactuals to the violation.
By ‘re-instating normality’ in memory we mean that the information
content associated with the norm violation has to be integrated into the
semantic networks of episodic and autobiographical memory. If the integration
does not occur then the person will perhaps be less able to interpret
novel experiences, and thus will be less able to effectively learn from
them. Counterfactual processing may be crucial for this type of human
learning (see papers in Roese and Olson, 1996; and Byrne, 1997; Roese,
1997). Following a given outcome, particularly negative outcomes, we appraise
the significance of the outcome by imagining alternatives or what might
have happened if things had gone differently. We then cognitively generate
simulations or imaginative scenarios that would allow or promote the alternative
outcome. We do this typically by changing or mutating various causal antecedents
of the outcome. We next compare the simulations of what might have been
to what actually happened in an attempt to restore the unwanted outcome
to a more normative routine outcome. To the extent that the comparison
process reveals that the counterfactual alternatives seem plausible or
possible as compared to what actually happened we feel tension, distress
or discomfort and are therefore motivated to try to right the situation
or to make sense of the situation. In addition, the contrastive reasoning
associated with CF processing may help reveal the ways in which unmet
goals might be achieved (Roese, Hur and Pennington, 1999). By engaging
in these counterfactual simulations we may more easily learn how to avoid
negative outcomes in the future or we learn how to strive more effectively
for current unmet goals or desired outcomes. It is as if the counterfactual
mechanism activates a motivational state in us such that we strive to
‘make right’ what had gone wrong or ‘unmet’ or what
had almost happened. We suggest that we experience these counterfactually-initiated
motivational urges or states along with associated imaginative embodiments
of these states, in dreams.
In waking life people will tend to accept the causal implications of
a counterfactual if the counterfactual is predicated on alterations of
a local or specific nature rather than alterations of more general laws
or universals. For example, people will more readily accept or allow themselves
to learn from the causal implications of a statement like "If he
had run a little faster, he would not have missed the bus" rather
than from statements like "If he had been able to fly, he would not
have missed the bus." Much of recent research on evaluations of counterfactuals
has focused on just what kinds of particular or local factors can be manipulated
in ‘acceptable’ counterfactuals. Kahneman and Miller (1986)
proposed these general rules of mutability:
1. Exceptions are more mutable than routines.
2. Ideals are less mutable than non-ideals. When asked to change the outcome
of a card game or tennis match subjects do so by imagining an improvement
of the losing game rather than a deterioration of the winning game.
3. Reliable knowledge is less mutable than unreliable knowledge.
4. Causes are less mutable than effects.
5. The actions of the focal or attended actor in a situation are more
mutable than those of a background actor.
In some dreams one can actually see the dreamer repeatedly generate a
counterfactual scenario along with attempts to return to normal routines
typically associated with the setting or situation depicted in the dream.
This repeated generation of counterfactual alternatives to the dream theme
or norm violation involves manipulation of these ‘constraints’
and results in a story line or narrative format wherein the dreamer attempts
to right or undo the abnormal situation. Take, for example, the following
dream of a 25-year-old on the 4th night of a laboratory study of dreaming.
The dream report is from Strauch and Meier, (1996) and occurred in the
second phase of REM.
"I am in a major American city where there is a baptism of a rocket
for a manned moon capsule. People have come from all over the world and
expect something sensational to happen. My sister and Suzanne and I have
been invited. Everything took place at a harbor and there was some kind
of breakdown at the start and the rocket took off ten or maybe a hundred
meters beyond the ramp, and then simply fell back down. And we wondered
what might have happened if it had toppled over—just plunged into
the water or if it had lifted 200 meters into the air and maybe flipped
over and then fallen into the water. If it had gone as high as one kilometer
it might have fallen into the city and on top of a skyscraper. And then
we fantasized whether the rocket might be propelled by the strength of
a statesmen—Giscard Estaing was there too— and thrown upwards
like that, which would certainly have caused a debacle. And that was what
happened. Several people representing all kinds of nations grabbed the
rocket at its bottom, lifted it up and tried to propel it skyward. And
the rocket did fly for about one hundred meters, twisted and returned
toward the water and everything was tried to save it. And they succeeded
once more in putting the rocket into orbit. Finally it did fall into the
water. All this time we took photographs from all kinds of perspectives."
The dreamer starts by announcing the situation that will be subjected
to counterfactual analysis: there was a breakdown in the takeoff pattern
of a rocket about to undergo its maiden voyage. The norm violation in
this case is the failed take-off. The subject himself then (counterfactually)
states: "And we wondered what might have happened if . . ."
and the generation of counterfactual scenarios begins. As the attempt
to undo the failed takeoff proceeds, more stringent, more desperate and
more bizarre scenarios are tried or at least imagined in order to undo
the negative event. This progressive generation of counterfactual alternatives
to an extra-normal or unexpected event may be one source of bizarre imagery
in dreams (e.g. Giscard D’Estaing propelling the rocket). In his
counterfactual solution to the problem of the failed take-off, the dreamer
attempted to obey the rules of mutability. He changed, for example, the
effects (falling into the water) rather than the causal (mechanical failure)
antecedents of the failed take-off. In addition he attempted to change
the activity of the ‘focal actor—in this case the crowds of
people come to witness the take off. They were recruited to try to propel
the rocket off the ground! After a number of scenarios are generated the
norm violation is "handled" or undone and counterfactual generation
ceases: " . . . they succeeded in putting the rocket into orbit."
Now we realize this rather sketchy and facile analysis is much too open
and ill-defined to be convincing. We mention it only to show the kinds
of items a scoring of counterfactual content could target. We will provide
more rigorous interpretive standards below.
In summary, we hypothesized that counterfactual thought is characteristic
of dreams and that cognitive operations in dreams function to identify
a norm violation recorded in episodic memory and then to re-instate normality
in memory by generating counterfactuals to the violation. To test this
hypothesis we analyzed (in Study 1) counterfactual-related content in
dream reports using memory reports as controls. In Study 2 we studied
occurrences of norm violations and probable attempts to "correct"
them as markers of counterfactual cognition in dream reports. For Study
1 we predicted significantly greater numbers of counterfactuals in dream
reports as compared to memory reports with the greatest difference in
CF content occurring between dream reports and pleasant memories. We detail
predictions for Study 2 below.
STUDY 1
Participants and Procedures
Pain Patients
We used memory reports gathered from 52 pain patients who had participated
in another study of neuropsychologic functions in patients with chronic
pain. Patients were volunteers recruited consecutively from the Pain Management
Group at the Boston Medical Center, Boston, MA. Mean age was 51.2 (SD=9.9)
years. Mean Beck depression inventory score was 13.6 (7.5). Length of
pain syndrome ranged from 1 to 50 years with a mean of 9.8 (10.6) years.
Respondents rated their general health as average (4.4 (1.5)) on a scale
from 1 (very poor health) to 9 (no problems). Severity (as assessed by
a combination of patient self-ratings and physician ratings) of the pain
syndrome ranged from 4 to 20 with a mean of 8.6 (2.6). Data from two patients
was discarded because the length of their memory reports was excessive
making it impossible to equate report lengths between memories and dreams.
This left an N of 50 pain patients producing 2 memories each—a pain
memory and a pleasant memory. Patients were asked to recall a pain memory
and a pleasant memory. After they wrote down a memory they were asked
a series of questions about the memory (data not reported here). Questions
were designed to assess encoding and retrieval dynamics as well as general
phenomenology of the memories themselves (another questionnaire—exactly
the same in all respects save that the word "physical pain"
was changed to "pleasant experience"—was also given to
patients). Instructions (for example, the pain memory) were as follows:
Now we would like you to try to remember a personal experience involving
physical pain that occurred sometime in the past. Choose any memory you
like but please describe it in as much detail as you can. Use the back
of this sheet to write out your description
Students
We used 50 randomly selected dream reports (to match the N=50 pain patients)
gathered from 300 undergraduate college students who participated in a
related study for course credit and whose score on an infrequency scale
was less than three—thereby eliminating those (2%) whose response
style was unreliable. Mean age of the group was 19 years. Most were female
(60%). As part of the study students completed a test battery consisting
of a demographic sheet, questions related to sleep and dream behaviors
(e.g. dream recall frequency, nightmares, somnambulism, bruxism, night
terrors etc.—data not reported here), instructions for reporting
a dream. The remainder of the battery was composed of scales that assessed
"object relations", including interpersonal dependency and depression.
Only counterfactual content data are reported here.
Coding Scheme Counterfactual Thinking (From Roese, 2000)
Mention of a Counterfactual
This variable is the number of mentions of a counterfactual thought in
a written passage (the memory or the dream report). A counterfactual is
any mention of an alternative to the actual state of affairs. It refers
to something that did NOT happen, but could have happened. Coders were
instructed to look for grammatical markers such as: "might have",
"could have", " almost", "should not have",
"if only", "if", "what if", "wish that."
Examples:
"If only I were taller, I'd get more dates."
"I should've tried harder."
"I wish that he hadn't done that."
"He almost made it to the track on time."
"He never would have made it without my help."
"It could've been worse."
"You might have tried harder."
Inter-Rater Reliability
A trained research assistant blind to the purpose of the study and the
first author independently scored each of the 150 reports for overt counterfactuals.
There was perfect 100% agreement for all CFs identified.
Results
Mean word lengths of dream reports (34.3 (29.0)) did not significantly
differ from word lengths of memory reports (41.1(52.5); t<1). There
were 4 (8%) overt counterfactuals among the pain reports, zero (0%) overt
counterfactuals among the pleasant memories and six (12%) among the dream
reports (chi square=259, df=2, p=.0001).
Discussion
As predicted we found significantly greater numbers of counterfactuals
in dream reports as compared to memory reports. The difference was especially
marked between dream reports and pleasant memories where, consistent with
the literature on counterfactual use, no overt counterfactuals were noted.
Nevertheless, there were only very few overt counterfactuals in either
the dream or memory reports. Thus, while this result is consistent with
our overall hypothesis (that dreams result from or reflect CF processing),
it certainly does not strongly confirm the hypothesis. In our next study
we therefore attempted to use more exact criteria to identify CFs and
their processing concomitants. Since counterfactuals typically attempt
to mentally "undo" a violation of normal or expected events,
we next scored norm violations and attempts to undo them in dreams. We
reasoned that if we could identify mental attempts to undo a violation
in a dream we would be identifying mental simulations that were initiated
to mentally handle a violation, i.e. a counterfactual. Thus, our first
prediction for this second study was that at least one norm violation
and an associated attempt to undo that violation would occur in each dream
report analyzed.
In Study 2 we also intended to examine possible relationships between
neuropsychologic variables and CF dream content. Recall that Solms (1997)
presented neuropsychologic evidence that demonstrated that the connections
between mediobasal frontal cortex and dienchephalic and brainstem sites
were crucial for the activation and maintenance of dreaming. Recent evidence
(Hooker, et al., 2000) points to the frontal lobes as crucial for CF processing
as well. Thus, our second prediction for Study 2 was that we would find
a correlation between measures of CF content and measures of frontal lobe
performance.
STUDY 2
Participants
Dream reports were gathered from a group of volunteers (N=76) who were
serving as participants in study of neuropsychological, health and religiosity
measures in community-dwelling middle-aged and elderly persons. Mean age
of the participants was 63.5 (12.3). They rated their general health as
quite good (7.5 (1.3) on a scale from 1 very poor health to 9 no problems).
None of the respondents were depressed according to self-report, or as
measured by the depression sub-scale (mean = 4.75 compared to 5.28 in
a non-depressed normative sample of persons aged 50-59 reported by Lovibund
and Lovibund, 1995-higher score=greater depression) of the Depression,
Anxiety and Stress Scale (DASS; Lovibund and Lovibund, 1995). Similarly
mean stress scores (DASSS 22.8(7.9)) and mean anxiety scores (DASSA 18.4(5.9))
were within normal limits.
Frontal Tests
Frontal function was assessed with fluency tasks: the Design Fluency
task and the verbal alternating Category-letter Fluency task. These are
standard, easy to administer frontal measures that index ability to initiate
and resist interference (Lezak, 1995; Elfgren and Risberg, 1998). For
design fluency, participants are asked to draw as many simple line designs
(that do not represent actual objects) as they can within the time allowed
(1 minute). The score is the total number of novel designs produced within
the minute time limit. For the alternating fluency task participants are
instructed to produce as many words as possible for a given letter and
then category (in this case animals) and then to alternate between letter
and category tasks. If any repetitions of items (perseverations) occur
on the second category fluency task they are subtracted from the total
score. We used the second category fluency score (after one alternation)
as this would have captured the tendency to perseverate. Higher scores
indicate less frontal impairment.
Temporal Lobe Activity Test
To examine possible selective effects of frontal function we assessed
temporal lobe function as well, using a Temporal Lobe signs Inventory
(Persinger and Marakec, 1991) that had been developed to work with patients
with temporal lobe epilepsy. We used a 30-item version of the inventory
where higher scores indicate greater temporal lobe dysfunction. Scores
could range between and 30 and 120. Mean TLI score for this sample of
persons was 53.0(15.2).
Scoring of Dream Content
Two graduate students were given a 2-hour training on scoring counterfactual-related
content. They were instructed to score each dream report in the following
way:
First identify descriptions of any norm violation. A norm violation was
defined as a surprising, abnormal, or unusual event that seemed to violate
the expectations or hopes of the dreamer such that the dreamer or others
in the dream attempted to undo or correct the event in question. Rarely
more than one norm violation per dream was identified. We randomly selected
only one of these to represent the dream. Thus each dream could have only
one norm violation for purposes of this analysis. (If there was no identifiable
norm violation scorers were to go to step 4 below and continue the scoring).
Next, write down a phrase (preferably taken from the dream) on the data
sheet to summarize the violation. Identify the overall emotional tone
of the dream, particularly the tone associated with the violation if there
is one. Choose from the following list (we chose emotions that we thought
would be associated with CFs) the emotion that best captures the emotional
tone and record the emotion’s associated letter on the data sheet:
regret (something bad happened and didn’t have to)
relief (something bad almost happened)
blame (something bad happened and it was someone else’s fault)
guilt (dreamer’s fault)
surprise (something good happened unexpectedly)
hope (something good may happen)
anxiety (something bad may happen)
If none of the above emotions occur in the dream or in association with
the norm violation then write a score of 0 on data sheet for emotion.
Are there identifiable attempts to correct the norm violation? 1=yes,
0=no. Are the attempts a counterfactual simulation of an alternative outcome
to the violation? 1=yes, 0-no.
What is the dreamer modifying (in the norm violation) in order to "re-instate
normality"?
Choose from among the following mutability variables:
no attempts to correct the situation = 0
focal (vs. secondary) actor mutates/changes/does something differently/acts
to correct anomaly (yes=1; no=0)
a controllable (vs. non-controllable) factor is manipulated or changed
(1=yes; 0=no)
the spatial setting is changed (1=yes; 0=no)
a previous action (vs. failure to act) is changed
an exceptional event is worked on vs. non-exceptional events (yes=1; no=0)
a salient cause (vs. a more subtle cause) is worked on (yes=1; no=2)
If an attempt to undo a norm violation was a counterfactual simulation
it should a) appear to the scorers as such and they would endorse yes
under the appropriate question concerning CF simulations and b) the attempt
should obey one or more of the mutability constraints summarized above.
Inter-Rater Reliability
Each dream scorer re-scored 10 reports that had been scored by the other.
Inter-rater correlations on these dream reports for all major content
categories was greater than .80. When disagreements on content occurred
these were settled by discussion.
Results
There were 34 dream reports for an overall group recall rate of (34/76=)
45%. Virtually all dream reports (97.1%) contained at least one norm violation
and 44.1% evidenced associated attempts to "undo the norm violation."
All of these attempts to undo the violation were scored as "simulations".
The most frequently cited emotions that appeared to be related to the
norm violation were anxiety and surprise. With regard to mutability factors:
47.1% contained transformations of the focal actor when generating counterfactual
attempts to undo the violation. Similarly, 35.1% manipulated controllable
factors, 5.9% manipulated the setting, 2.9% manipulated an action, 5.9%
manipulated an exceptional event (vs. a routine event) and 46.7% manipulated
an effect (vs. a cause.). Virtually all of the norm violations that triggered
an attempt to undo the violation (i.e. counterfactuals) were from the
point of view of waking cognition, highly unusual. These were things like
"encountering a building covered with bird cages", "being
surrounded by bears", "pages of a sermon hopelessly mixed-up",
"had a different menu from friends", "tiny scissors",
"inability to articulate directions to her house", "trying
to escape tornadoes" etc.
Measures of right frontal function (design fluency) but not temporal
lobe function were correlated with number of attempts to correct the norm
violation (rho=.45, p=.010), and simulations (rho=.38, p=.034). DASS anxiety
scale score was correlated with simulations as well (rho=.39, p=.01).
Discussion
We tested the hypothesis that counterfactual thought is characteristic
of dreams and that cognitive operations in dreams function to identify
a norm violation or novel outcome recorded in autobiographical memory
and then to integrate this new content into memory by generating counterfactuals
to the violation. In study 1 we compared counterfactual content in 50
dream reports, 50 pain memory reports and 50 pleasant memory reports (equated
for word length) and found, as predicted, a significantly greater number
of CFs in dream and in pain memory reports relative to pleasant memory
reports. In study 2 we used a more liberal method for scoring CF content
and analyzed 34 dream reports obtained from elderly individuals engaged
in an ongoing study of neuropsychologic, health and religiosity variables.
In the elderly sample and with our more liberal scoring procedures we
found that norm violations along with counterfactual-like attempts to
correct the violations occurred in 97% of reports. In 47% of these cases
(roughly half of all reports), attempts to undo the violation obeyed at
least one constraint on mutability typically observed in laboratory studies
of CF processing. Cognitive operations associated with attempts to undo
the norm violation (e.g. transforming focal actors or the most recent
causal antecedent of the violation) were significantly correlated with
measures of right frontal function. We construe these findings as preliminary
support for the hypothesis that counterfactual processing occurs in dreams
and we suggest that dreaming may involve a process of learning from novel
outcomes (particularly negative outcomes) by simulating alternative ways
of handling these outcomes through counterfactual cognitive processes.
Role of the Norm Violation
The fact that the dreamer commonly expressed surprise or anxiousness
when confronted with these anomalies suggests some reflective capacity
or ability to evaluate anomalies within the dream. The input or triggering
stimulus for the CF processing in the dream is an extra-normal violation
of a routine or some kind of negative event or affect. The dream prefers
novel and out of the ordinary input. The operations performed on this
input generally involve alterations in a number of mutable and causal
antecedents of the norm violation or the negative affect. We speculate
that these counterfactual operations on the norm violation function to
help the dreamer learn from or cope with novel and negative situations.
CFs and Dreams in Coping With Trauma
Investigators of both dreaming and counterfactual processing have independently
suggested that the object of their studies appear to be vitally important
tools for coping with trauma. Several reviews have appeared recently that
cover the ways in which dreams help persons cope with emotional and physical
trauma (Barrett, 2001; Hartmann, 1996). People who have undergone a traumatic
experience often find themselves dreaming about it repeatedly. For severe
cases of trauma (as in some cases of post traumatic stress disorder, for
example), however, dreams about the original trauma do not seem to work
as a ‘working through’ mechanism. Such dreams are experienced
as persistent, unwelcome, intrusive and unhelpful. CFs too can become
dysfunctional as when people engage in involuntary and obsessional ruminations
about what might have been. In perhaps more typical cases, however, people
do, in fact, functionally use counterfactuals to help cope with traumatic
life events. Davis and Lehman (1995) found counterfactual thoughts to
be quite prevalent in parents of babies who had died of sudden infant
death syndrome and in families of victims of drunken drivers. The bereaved
in Davis and Lehman’s studies did not gravitate toward a single,
highly mutable antecedent when mentally attempting to undo the tragic
outcome but rather, like the "typical" dreamer, they generated
a variety of counterfactual possibilities in an effort to come to terms
with the tragedy.
Role of Right Frontal Cortex
Given the fact that we used only a paper and pencil test of right frontal
function we do not feel comfortable speculating on the role of brain functions
in dreaming but some remarks are in order. PET scan studies consistently
show activation of limbic and orbitofrontal (OFC, but not dorsolateral)
regions of the cortex during REM sleep (Hobson et al., 1998). OFC also
appears to regulate emotional and autonomic nervous system functions.
The right orbital frontal cortex, particularly Brodmann's posterior medial
orbital prefrontal cortical areas 12 and 13 integrates information from
hypothalamic and limbic regions. OFC may be a regulatory center for basal
forebrain circuits as it has strong connectivity with regions in limbic
sites, the hippocampus and the basolateral, central, and extended amygdala
regions. Through these connections OFC has access to emotional memory
and to ongoing emotional processing. The right OFC also appears to specialize
in negative affective responses. Davidson (1995) has presented a body
of electrophysiologic data that suggests that the left frontal lobe is
more likely to mediate positive emotions than the right and the right
frontal cortex more typically mediates negative emotions. Davidson’s
data are consistent with findings from studies of patients with brain
injuries. Left frontal damage is far more likely to cause depression than
are similar lesions to the right frontal cortex. Conversely lesions in
right orbitofrontal cortex are more likely to lead to mania and unconcern
than are similar lesions on the left.
Role of Negative Affect and Memory Retrieval
We have seen that both dreams and counterfactuals are preferentially
activated by negative affect. We, in fact, found greater numbers of CFs
in painful memories and in dreams as compared to pleasant memories. One
of the most potent activators of CF processing is negative affect (Roese,
1997). It may be that right frontal activation is associated with negative
affect, dreaming and counterfactual processing. In support of this possibility
are the recent findings that link right frontal sites with episodic memory
retrieval (crucial for both dream and counterfactual processing) and in
representations of the "Self". In a review of PET studies on
episodic encoding and retrieval processes Wheeler, Stuss and Tulving (1997)
conclude that episodic retrieval is associated with an increased blood
flow in the right frontal cortex with no increased blood flow in left
frontal cortex; while episodic encoding is associated with the opposite
pattern, i.e. increased flow in left-frontal cortex and no increased flow
in right frontal cortex. They call this set of findings HERA for hemispheric
encoding/retrieval asymmetry. Given the right OFC’s involvement in
negative affect and in representations of the self it should not be surprising
to find that it is also involved in processing negative memories as well.
It may be that right frontal sites support counterfactual processing as
well given its role in dreams and in negative affect.
Limitations of These Studies.
Although results reported herein were in line with our predictions and
are consistent with our overall hypothesis (that CF processing occurs
in dreams), we wish to emphasize limitations of these studies in hopes
that future work can remedy them. First, our scoring procedures for identifying
CF-related content are new and used on only 34 available dreams in study
2. These scoring procedures should be used on many more dreams by several
different coders before they are adopted as the best method for extracting
CF content from dreams. Second, in study 1 we compared dream reports from
college students with memory reports obtained from patients with chronic
pain. Future work should compare dream vs. memory reports from the same
individuals. Finally, because of these limitations and the relatively
small number of dream reports we had to work with in study 2, we consider
our results as only preliminary support for our overall hypothesis, pending
future findings.
In summary, we predicted that an analysis of dream content would yield
evidence for counterfactual processing. We confirmed that prediction,
thus providing preliminary evidence for a new and distinctive characterization
of dream cognition. We analyzed free recall dream reports obtained from
elderly individuals and dream reports obtained from younger subjects for
evidence of counterfactual simulations to norm violations in memory. We
found that norm violations along with counterfactual attempts to correct
the violations occurred in a majority of reports. In roughly half of all
reports attempts to undo the violation obeyed at least one constraint
on mutability typically observed in laboratory studies of CF processing.
Cognitive operations associated with attempts to undo the norm violation
were significantly correlated with measures of right frontal function.
We conclude that dreaming may involve a process of learning from novel
outcomes (particularly negative outcomes) by simulating alternative ways
of handling these outcomes through counterfactual cognitive processes.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work was supported, in part, by a grant from the Templeton Foundation.
We thank Dr. Brian McGeenly for help in collecting data from the pain
patients. We thank Dr. Michael Zborowski for allowing us to analyze dream
reports collected from his students.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
REFERENCES
Byrne, R. M. J. (1997). Cognitive Processes in Counterfactual Thinking
About What Might Have Been. The Psychology of Learning and Motivation,
37, 105-154.
Barrett, D. (2001). Trauma and Dreams. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press.
Davidson, R.J. (1995). Cerebral Asymmetry, Emotion and Affective Style.
In: RJ Davidson and K. Hugdahl (Eds.), Brain Asymmetry, pp. 361-383. Cambridge,
MA: The MIT Press.
Davis, C.G. and Lehman D.R. (1995). Counterfactual Thinking and Coping
with Traumatic Life Events. In: NJ Roese and JM Olson (Eds), What Might
Have Been: The Social Psychology of Counterfactual Thinking, pp. 353-374,
Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Domhoff, G., (1996). Finding Meaning in Dreams: A Quantitative Approach.
New York; Plenum Press.
Elfgren, C.I. and Risberg, J. (1998). Lateralized Frontal Blood Flow
Increases During Fluency Tasks: Influence of Cognitive Strategy. Neuropsychologia,
36(6), 505-512.
Foulkes, D. (1985). Dreaming: A Cognitive-Psychological Analysis. Hillsdale:
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Hartmann, E. (1996). Outline for a Theory on the Nature and Functions
of Dreaming. Dreaming, 6, 147-169.
Hobson, J., Pace-Schott, E.F., Stickgold, R., and Kahn, D. (1998). To
Dream or Not to Dream?: Relevant Data from New Neuroimaging and Electrophysiological
Studies. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 8, 239-244.
Hooker, C., Roese, N.J., and Park, S. (2000). Impoverished counterfactual
thinking is associated with schizophrenia. Psychiatry, 63, 326-335.
Kahneman, D., and Miller, D.T. (1986). Norm Theory: Comparing Reality
to its Alternatives. Psychological Review, 93, 136-153.
Lakoff, G. (1993). How Metaphor Structures Dreams: The Theory of Conceptual
Metaphor Applied to Dream Analysis. Dreaming, 3, 77-98.
Lezak, M. (1995). Neuropsychological Assessment. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Lovibond, S. H., and Lovibond, P. F. (1995). Manual for the Depression
Anxiety Stress Scales. Sydney: The Psychology Foundation of Australia
Inc.
McNamara, P. (2000). Counterfactual thought in dreams. Dreaming, 10,
237-246.
Persinger, M. A., and Marakec, K. (1991). "Interactions Between
Temporal Lobe Signs, Imaginings, Beliefs, and Gender: The Effect Upon
Logical Inference." Imagination, Cognition, and Personality, 11,
149-166.
Rechtschaffen, A. (1978). The Single-Mindedness and Isolation of Dreams.
Sleep, 1, 97-109.
Roese, N.J. (2000). Email communication to the first author.
Roese, N.J. (1997). Counterfactual Thinking. Psychological Bulletin,
121 (1), 133-148.
Roese, NJ, Hur-T., and Pennington,G.L. (1999). Counterfactual thinking
and regulatory focus: Implications for action versus inaction and sufficiency
versus necessity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77(6):
1109-1120.
Roese, N.J., and Olson, J. M. (1996). Counterfactual thinking: A Critical
Overview. In: NJ Roese and JM Olson (Eds), What Might Have Been : The
Social Psychology of Counterfactual Thinking, pp. 1-56, Mahwah: NJ: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates.
Solms, M., (1997). The Neuropsychology of Dreams. A Clinico-Anatomical
Study. Mahwah: NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Strauch, I. and Meier, B. (1996). In Search of Dreams: Results of Experimental
Dream Research. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Wheeler, M.A., Stuss, D.T. & Tulving, E. 1997. Toward a Theory of
Episodic Memory: The Frontal Lobes and Autonoietic Consciousness. Psychological
Bulletin, 121, (3), 331-354.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 Department of Neurology, Boston University School of Medicine, Boston,
MA.
2 Program in Science and Religion, Boston University School of Theology,
Boston, MA.
3 Boston University School of Theology, Boston, MA.
4 Correspondence should be directed to Patrick McNamara, Ph.D., Department
of Neurology (127), VA New England Healthcare System, 150 South Huntington
Avenue, Boston, MA 02130; e-mail: mcnamar@bu.edu or to Jensine Andresen,
Ph.D., Program in Science, Philosophy and Religion, Boston University
School of Theology, 745 Commonwealth Avenue, Boston, MA 02215; e-mail:
jensine@bu.edu.
Original address of this text :
http://www.asdreams.org/journal/articles/12-3_mcnamara.htm
Please copy this address to the address bar of your
internet browser and press the "enter" key.
(We prefer not to put actual links because
often page locations change and then our log files get cluttered with
error messages
- if the address does not work try to find it from the homepage of the
website in question).
|
