Theme : Dreams
The Problems with Activation-Synthesis Theory
G. William Domhoff
University of California, Santa Cruz
NOTE: This is an unpublished paper. If you use this article in research,
please use the following citation:
Domhoff, G. W. (2000). The Problems with Activation-Synthesis Theory.
Retrieved February 4, 2003 from the World Wide Web: http://www.dreamresearch.net/Articles/domhoff_2000e.html
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Abstract
Dream content is more coherent, consistent over time, and continuous with
waking emotional concerns than the activation-synthesis theory would predict.
It cannot easily accommodate the fact that children under age 5 have infrequent
and bland dreams even though they have normal Rapid Eye Movement (REM)
sleep. It is not consistent with the fact that there are patients with
forebrain lesions who do not dream even though they have REM sleep. A
neurocognitive perspective should focus on the forebrain system of dream
generation and begin with the findings on dream content in adults and
the developmental nature of dreaming in children.
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Introduction
A large body of findings with the Hall/Van de Castle coding system (Domhoff,
1996; Domhoff, 1999a; Hall & Van de Castle, 1966) shows that dreams
are more coherent, consistent over time for both individuals and groups,
and continuous with past and present waking emotional concerns than the
activation-synthesis theory, with its emphasis on brainstem-driven bizarreness,
can accommodate. (Hobson, 1988; Hobson, Pace-Schott, & Stickgold,
2000; Hobson, Stickgold, & Pace-Schott, 1998) In addition, Foulkes'
(1982; 1999) laboratory discovery of low levels of dreaming until ages
9-11 joins with Solms' (1997) findings with brain-lesioned patients in
demonstrating that REM sleep is insufficient for dreaming. A new neurocognitive
theory of dreaming therefore should begin with the hypothesis that Foulkes'
developmental findings may correlate with the maturation of the forebrain
system of dream generation first uncovered through creative neuropsychological
detective work by Solms. In addition, the findings with the Hall/Van de
Castle system on the lifelong persistence of various kinds of negative
dream content suggest there is a "repetition dimension" in people's
dream life (Domhoff, 1993; Domhoff, 1996) that may relate to the temporal-limbic
and frontal-limbic origins of dreaming in Solms' model.
The Brainstem/Bizarreness Commitment
Hobson et. al. present interesting ideas that may explain away much of
the "dreaming" in NREM sleep. However, they do concede there
is enough dreamlike mental activity in NREM sleep to challenge the strict
equation of dreaming and the REM stage of sleep, especially late in the
sleep period. The empirical dream psychologists who abandoned the REM
sleep/dreaming equation decades ago in the face of contradictory evidence
summarized by Berger (1967; 1969), Foulkes (1966; 1967), and Hall (1967)
did not ask for much more than what is now granted in these articles.
The Hobson group is wrong to chastise psychologists for focusing on the
cognitive level when the constant changes in their own model show that
their comprehensive mind-brain isomorphism is extremely premature.
It is regrettable that Hobson et. al took so long to broaden their theory
in the face of contradictory evidence available long ago (Vogel, 1978),
but it is possible that the "state" transition at sleep onset
and the greater activation late in a sleep period explain much dreamlike
NREM mentation. The disappointment is their continuing brainstem commitment.
In the face of the new and old findings synthesized by Solms to show that
brainstem activation is not sufficient for dreaming, and in some unknown
percentage of cases may not even be necessary, it would seem that research
relating the forebrain system to many different aspects of dream content
should now be the primary focus of mind-brain isomorphists.
Hobson et. al. justify their desire to keep the brainstem at the forefront
of their theory on the basis of a commitment to a mind-brain isomorphism.
However, this insistence also may be due to their strong belief that dreams
are bizarre and discontinuous, although one of their own studies reported
"discontinuities" in only 34% of 200 dreams (Rittenhouse, Stickgold,
& Hobson, 1994). Most others who have studied large samples of dream
reports from groups and individuals see dreams as even more like realistic
(Dorus, Dorus, & Rechtschaffen, 1971; Foulkes, 1985; Snyder, 1970;
Strauch & Meier, 1996). For example, Hall (1966) concluded that only
10% of 815 home and laboratory reports from 14 adult males had at least
one "unusual element," using a scale that can be found in Domhoff
(1996). In studies comparing REM reports to samples of waking thought
collected from participants reclining in a darkened room, the waking samples
were rated as more dreamlike (Reinsel, Antrobus, & Wollman, 1992;
Reinsel, Wollman, & Antrobus, 1986).
To support their focus on brainstem activation and the bizarre nature
of dream content, Hobson et. al. have to challenge several different sets
of impressive findings. First, they reject Foulkes' (1982; 1999) conclusions
on the low levels of REM dreaming in young children with the claim that
these children are not able to communicate in words about their dreams.
But Foulkes' data show that the rate of recall correlates with visuospatial
skills, and that there are older children with good communication skills
and poor visuospatial skills who do not recall very many dreams in the
laboratory. It is more likely that young children do not dream often or
well by adult standards, a conclusion favoring a cognitive theory of dreams.
Hobson et. al. reject Foulkes' findings on the banality of the few dreams
his young participants did report by saying the laboratory situation is
not conducive to typical dreaming, but Foulkes (1979; 1996; 1999) already
has answered that claim very effectively. More generally, they overstate
the differences between home and laboratory dreams. This is shown most
recently in a reanalysis using effect sizes (Domhoff & Schneider,
1999) with the original codings from the most comprehensive study of this
issue, which was carried out by Hall (1966) with 11 young adult male participants
who each spent three to four consecutive weeks sleeping in a laboratory
bedroom in a house in a residential neighborhood.
Hobson et. al. denigrate the findings on the everyday nature of most
dream content by saying that psychological measurement has not been adequate,
but they have not demonstrated that their evolving rating scales for the
slippery concept of bizarreness can be used reliably across laboratories.
Furthermore, they ignore most of the findings with the Hall/Van de Castle
system, which has shown high reliability when used by researchers in many
different countries and produced results that have been replicated several
times (Domhoff, 1996; Domhoff, 1999b) However, Hobson et. al. do note
the Hall/Van de Castle findings on emotion in dreams, which anticipate
their own findings of more negative than positive emotions, more reports
of emotions in women's dreams, and no gender differences in the distribution
of emotions (Merritt, Stickgold, Pace-Schott, Williams, & Hobson,
1994).
In their effort to emphasize differences between REM and NREM reports,
Hobson et. al. argue against any control for length of report. In so doing
they do not take seem to realize this problem is handled without loss
of data by the indicators based on percentages and ratios that are now
standard in the Hall/Van de Castle system (Domhoff, 1999b; Schneider &
Domhoff, 1995-2000).
Strong support for the use of the Hall/Van de Castle content indicators
in resolving disputes about the nature of REM and NREM reports is provided
by a study Hall carried out three decades ago, but that was only recently
reported by Domhoff and Schneider (1999). When NREM reports from early
and late in the sleep period were compared with REM reports, several of
the usual differences appeared. For example, the "cognitive activities
percent" (the number of cognitive activities divided by the total
number of all activities) was 20% in NREM reports, but only 11% in REM
reports. Conversely, the "verbal activity percent" was 37% in
REM reports, but only 22% in REM reports. However, the NREM reports from
after the third REM period of the night were more similar to REM reports
than early NREM reports on a summary measure for a wide range of Hall/Van
de Castle categories. These results are consistent with the recent theorizing
by Hobson et. al.
Hobson et. al. call for studies of dreams at home to obtain a more realistic
sample of dream content, but they overlook the replicated longitudinal
results with the Hall/Van de Castle system, which show that dream content
can be constant for individual adults over years and decades, something
that might not be expected if dreaming is as chaotic and bizarre as they
claim (Domhoff, 1996). One of these longitudinal studies showed that the
dreams of "the Engine Man," used by Hobson (1988) to show the
bizzareness of dream structure, are highly consistent in content over
just a three-month period. His dreams are also below the male norms on
key social interactions, and continuous with his waking life in terms
of the people and activities in his dreams (Domhoff, 1996).
Conclusion
If the most methodologically sound descriptive empirical findings were
to be used as the starting point for future dream theorizing, the picture
would look like this (1) dreaming is a cognitive achievement that develops
throughout childhood (Foulkes, 1999); (2) there is a forebrain network
for dream generation that is most often, but not always, triggered by
brainstem activation (Hobson et al., 1998; Solms, 1997); and (3) much
of dream content is coherent, consistent over time, and continuous with
past or present waking emotional concerns (Domhoff, 1996). The activation-synthesis
theory espoused by Hobson et. al. cannot encompass these three findings.
A new neurocognitive theory of dreams is therefore needed (Domhoff, 2001).
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